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A B S T R A C T   
Artisanal fisheries employ small simple craft making fishers, processors and traders vulnerable to seasonal 
fluctuations. This study examines effects of seasonality on supply, trading relationships and benefits distribution 
in two small-scale fisheries in Liberia. Quantities of seafood traded in the dry season were 6 times higher than 
during the rainy season. Analysis of organizational structures and marketing channels of value chains; and the 
differences in net benefits of actors, show that market relationships promoted competition among buyers 
compared to captive relationships. The difference in net benefits between fishers and traders was significant but 
fishers net incomes were significantly reduced during the rainy season relative to fish traders. We identify key 
areas of possible policy interventions, such as improving quality and infrastructure, tackling power asymmetries 
and promoting increased competition among middlemen.   
1. Introduction 
Seafood is a highly traded product and seafood trade has shaped the 
livelihoods of millions of people [15,19,30,56]. Seasonal fluctuations in 
landings lead to an intermittent reduction in fish supply, benefits and 
related trade [26]. Understanding the impact of seasonality is essential, 
as the number of people involved in processing and marketing continues 
to grow [15,26,61]. 
In most cases prices of raw materials are decided by producers at the 
harvesting end of value chains [15,54,57]. This is expected to influence 
how net return among actors and between fishing seasons are distrib-
uted along the value chains [57]. Fishers typically derive a relatively low 
share of the overall benefits flowing from seafood trade compared to 
actors downstream the value chain [17,48,57]. 
Different types of customers [58], forms of transactions or gover-
nance (patron-client relationships) [2,4,13,20,29,35,36] and gender 
[21] have been found to affect benefit flow in small-scale fisheries (SSF) 
[17]. The effects of seasonality in seafood supply on trading relation-
ships and distribution of benefits of SSF producers, is neither well un-
derstood nor documented. Earlier analyses investigating differences in 
prices of seafood products and benefits along the value chains have often 
neglected seasonal fluctuations in fish supply. This could partly be 
because SSF value chains can be complex and difficult to examine 
methodically [9,6,39,52]. 
This paper investigates seasonal flows and distribution of net benefits 
and relationships between actors in two SSF in Liberia; the Kru and the 
Fanti fisheries. To understand the characteristics of the small-scale 
seafood market, the following research questions are put forward. 
What is the value-adding role of the main actors in the value chains and 
how are their benefits impacted by the relationships among them and 
the seasonal changes in fish supply? What are the organizational 
structures and marketing channels of the value chains and the differ-
ences in average net benefits of actors at each node of the value chains 
during the dry and rainy seasons? The paper is divided into four parts. A 
description of the fisheries in Liberia is followed by a description of 
methods, results, discussion and conclusions. 
1.1. Fisheries in Liberia 
Libera has a coastline of 579 km and an exclusive economic zone of 
246,152 km2 harboring valuable demersal and pelagic fisheries re-
sources, which in turn are a source of food and livelihoods for many 
Liberians and an important source of government revenue [44]. The 
fisheries resources are exploited by Industrial fisheries and SSF 
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deploying multiple types of fishing craft and gear [40,42]. The estimated 
total coastal catch in 2014 was about 30,000 metric tons, about 86% 
produced by the SSF [40]. The catch is mainly consumed locally, while 
shortages in fish supply are complemented through imports. The fish-
eries contribute about 10% to the GDP of Liberia [5]. 
Industrial fishery is any large-scale harvesting or associated activities 
using vessels with an engine capacity >100bhp and >90 ft [37]. The 
industrial fishery comprises coastal trawl- and offshore large pelagic 
fisheries [38,40]. In the coastal fishery trawlers deploy mid-water and 
bottom trawls mainly targeting the shallow-water demersal finfish and 
shrimp species [40]. This fishery accounts for about 14% of the total 
marine catch landed in Liberia and its catch is supplied to the domestic 
market, although a part is also exported [38,40]. 
The offshore large pelagic fishery consists of large vessels that 
employ purse seines, longlines and pole and line gears primarily tar-
geting tuna and tuna-like species [38]. In 2011 government revenues 
from the industrial fishery subsector totalled US$ 400,000. This figure 
increased sharply to about US$ 6.0 million in 2013 [38]. This is most 
probably because of the fisheries management reforms and increased 
enforcement introduced by the Government of Liberia in 2010 [12]. 
The SSF employ canoes powered by sails and paddles and open boats 
<60 ft motorized with engine capacity not exceeding 40 hp, where the 
proprietor is directly involved in the daily operations of the business 
[37]. The SSF are estimated to provide livelihoods for nearly 33,000 
full-time participants, around 33% of whom are fishermen [12,18,40]. 
While Liberian participation in the SSF is about 80%, the rest are for-
eigners mainly from Ghana, Togo, Senegal and the Ivory Coast. Among 
the Liberians, 60% are females [40]. 
Majority of the small-scale fishers operate 5–7 m long dug-out ca-
noes, using mostly sails and paddles for propulsion [18]. These fishers 
are traditionally referred to as Kru because of the type of dugout canoe 
they operate but in practice they may be a mix of people comprising Kru, 
Vai, Bassa, Grebo and other tribes [40]. The most common gears are 
cast-nets, beach-seines, gill nets, long lines, hooks and lines, and traps 
[60]. While Kru fishermen mainly target the inshore demersal stock 
complexes, the Pseudotolithus species locally known as cassava fish is a 
major commercial target species accounting for about 20% of the overall 
catch produced in the SSF according to official statistics of the National 
Fisheries and Aquaculture Authority. In 2013 over 2500 Kru canoes 
operated from 114 landing sites along the coast (Table 1). 
In addition, there are over 750 larger boats (Table 1), 10–15 m long 
and mostly powered by 15–40 horsepower outboard engines, tradi-
tionally called Fanti boats [12]. Most deploy ring nets and principally 
target small pelagic Sardinella species locally called bonny. Some how-
ever use set nets, drift nets and hook and line targeting shallow and 
deep-water demersals and some larger pelagic species [12,60]. About 
60% of the total catch in the SSF comes from Fanti fishery [38]. 
Small-scale fish trading involves multiple actors and purchasing 
either for processing or for distribution and consumption [19,40]. The 
actors involved in fish trade are generally artisanal fish traders pre-
dominantly women (98%) or large-scale Korean traders. A small-scale 
fish trader is typically a woman who buys up to 150 kg, on average 
70 kg, of fish at a time and goes on foot or uses public transport (such as 
taxi, tricycle or motorbike) to bring fish to her clients. A Korean trader 
typically purchases more than 300 kg day  1 of cassava fish from Kru 
fishers and uses privately organized vehicles (usually mini trucks filled 
with chillers), to transport the fish to Monrovia, before exporting. 
Seasonality greatly affects small-scale fishing in Liberia [40]. During 
the dry season, October-April when the weather is good the sea is calm 
and fishing conditions are favorable; catches can be quite high. During 
this season, the intermittent advent of big shoals of small pelagic fish in 
inshore-waters can result in large harvests and considerable increase in 
downstream activities. Fish traders and processors neither have the ca-
pacity nor the means to purchase and process all the landed catch, 
resulting in increased levels of post-harvest losses [40]. During the rainy 
season, in May–October, periods of strong ocean currents, heavy storms 
and rainfall prevent small-scale fishers from going to sea. The 
small-scale Kru cassava fish and the Fanti bonny fisheries are the focus of 
this study. 
2. Methods 
Value chain analysis [55,59] is used to evaluate the organizational 
structure by describing the value-addition activities in two SSF in 
Liberia. The concept dates back to Porter 1985 [47] and has since 
evolved with others making significant contributions on value chain 
governance and institutions [4,22,23,29,35]. In value chain analysis, 
governance relates to the corporation and coordination between the 
participants (actors) facilitating the delivery of a product from primary 
production to final use and involves the power some key actors manage 
to exercise control over others through their bargaining power, to be 
able to allocate the value produced within the respective value chains 
[3,55]. Gereffi and associates [23] identified five types of governance 
structure in value chains, based on the complexity and knowledge 
necessary for transaction, codification and effective transmission of the 
information between the participants and current competence related to 
the necessity of transaction, namely market, modular, relational, captive 
and hierarchy. 
Market value chains are characterized by a low level of power 
asymmetry between producers and consumers in which no single value 
chain actor has control over others. Buyers typically react to specifica-
tions of products in a market exchange established by the producers 
because information exchange is relatively good [23]. In hierarchy value 
chains, the highest level of control is concentrated in one lead producer 
that explicitly coordinates and controls the actors and is typified by 
vertical integration. Modular value chain mirrors a production 
arrangement interaction that can effectively adjust products specifica-
tions to consumers’ needs [43]. Relational value chains incorporate 
price, specifications, reputation, trust and mutual reliance and direct 
information and contact between producers and consumers [43]. 
Captive value chains emerge when the producers’ abilities are low, 
resulting in a greater level of involvement of the buyers on whom the 
producers become financially dependent. Gereffi and associates [23] 
governance framework reflects governance context in the small-scale 
Kru and Fanti fisheries value chains in Liberia. Their governance 
framework, which has been employed by researchers to analyze fish-
eries value chains [43,49], is adopted and used to identified types of 
relationships between actors in the Kru and Fanti fish value chains in 
Liberia. 
To shed light on the distribution of net benefits flowing between 
fishers and traders, price analysis [6] is conducted using price and cost 
data from participants in each node of the respective value chains. Based 
on this, driving forces such as bargaining power and trading relation-
ships, which influence inefficiencies in fishery value chains are identi-
fied. This is crucial for determining appropriate policy 
Table 1 
Locations of small-scale fisheries landing sites and the number of vessels and 
fishers in 2013.  
Coastal county No of landing 
sites 
No. of Kru 
canoes 






7 222 57 1155 
Bomi 2 39 26 161 
Montserrado 7 453 213 2151 
Margibi 6 72 44 339 
Grand Bassa 22 549 187 2454 
River Cess 13 247 55 637 
Sinoe 24 385 90 985 
Grand Kru 24 330 19 798 
Maryland 9 234 66 771 
Total 114 2531 757 9451 
Source: MRAG [40]. 
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recommendations, for possible interventions of participants within the 
value chain itself and those outside it, typically government or 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to upgrade weaker nodes [6, 
32]. 
2.1. Study sites 
Primary empirical data and information were collected from boat 
owners (fishermen) and artisanal fish traders in November-December 
2017 and May-June 2018 at three landing sites used by both Kru and 
Fanti, i.e. Robertsport, Point Four and Marshall beaches in Grand Cape 
Mount, Montserrado and Margibi counties (Fig. 1). 
The selection of study areas was based on convenience [7,51]. In 
societies like Liberia where the road network is poor, it is difficult if not 
impossible to implement a more formal sampling method. Therefore, the 
landing sites were selected based on chance and accessibility. While the 
sites are samples of convenience, they are still representative of the 
small-scale Kru and Fanti fisheries in Liberia where fishers deploy their 
fishing craft and gear where artisanal fish traders and Korean whole-
salers participate in seafood trade [40]. They represent a third of the 
nine coastal counties, with 18% of the 114 landing sites, 30% and 41% 
of the total number of Kru and Fanti boat operators respectively and 
39% of the total number of fishers in the SSF in Liberia (Tab 1). Data 
were collected to identify the nature of the trading relationships and to 
assess the net benefits of the different actors in the respective fishery 
value chains examined. 
2.2. Focus group discussions and survey 
Data was collected through focus group discussions, personal in-
terviews with actors including fishermen and fish traders and from key 
informants. Kru fishermen interviewed are local fishers who own and 
operate Kru type canoes and primarily target cassava fish, while a Fanti 
fisherman, owns and operates a Fanti type boat targeting bonny. Three 
focus group interviews were conducted, in November–December 2017 
and January–February 2018. 
Prior to the actual survey, official letters were written to the fishing 
communities by NaFAA informing them about the type of study, data to 
be collected, target respondents and researchers and study period. With 
support from the fishery authorities and local fishers’ leadership, a list of 
possible interviewees for the focus groups, participating in both fish-
eries, was prepared before visiting the study sites. The list was prepared 
based on lists of members of the various fishers’ groups, provided by 
their respective leaderships from which participants were selected for 
the group discussions. Following this, a systematic random sampling, 
where each kth participant was chosen from the lists for discussion, was 
employed [7]. 
Participants included Kru and Fanti fishermen, fishers’ wives, pro-
cessors, fishmongers, mini cold-room operators, representatives of local 
fishermen leadership and key informants. For comparison amongst in-
terviewees and landing sites a focus group of 15 SSF actors was selected 
at each study site and discussions lasted for about 4 h. The open-ended 
structure of the questions allowed for a follow-up and conversation 
about initial responses. 
Questions were designed to elicit information about the major types 
of fish products, marketing flows/links and size, actors and the impor-
tance and value of the trading relationships, value-adding roles of 
different actors, credit arrangements and type of repayment as well as 
seasonal differences in the respective value chains, using semi- 
structured open-ended questions. The day following the actual inter-
view, notes recorded by hand and direct observations were typed in a 
Word document for analysis. This was used to check for key concepts 
pertinent to this analysis and trends in the literature. The information 
gathered was used to identify and describe the main components of the 
value chains, actors and their roles in value-adding, trading relation-
ships between actors as well as drawbacks hindering the performance of 
the value chains. 
Random sampling technique was used to choose subjects for the 
survey (personal interviews) [7]. The questionnaire consisted of struc-
tured questions on the details of daily operations and provided addi-
tional in-depth information on similar issues captured during the group 
interviews and quantitative data on prices and costs. 
A total of 294 interviews were conducted; 150 in the dry season and 
144 in the rainy season, representing 180 in the Kru cassava fish value 
chain, 60 fishermen and 120 fresh fish traders and processors and 114 in 
the Fanti bonny value chain including 60 fishermen and 54 processors. 
The fishermen and fish traders sampled, in the Kru and Fanti fisheries 
during the dry season, were different from those sampled during the 
rainy season although the methodology employed was the same. Prices 
of fish purchased and traded as well as mean quantity of fish sold on a 
typical day were collected from actors in each node of the value chain. 
Korean wholesalers and local cold room operators were not willing to 
participate in personal interviews. So, in this present investigation, ac-
tors are restricted to fishermen (i.e. Kru and Fanti), fresh fish traders and 
fish processors, that directly purchase seafood from these fishermen and 
wholesalers1 (middlemen) and trade at various locations-either to local 
consumers, hoteliers, eateries or other traders, in Monrovia and its 
hinterlands. Information was analyzed separately for the dry and rainy 
seasons. 
In addition to the focus group discussion and personal interviews, 
three key informants were selected based on their specific roles and 
experience in the value chains examined. This was regarded necessary to 
overcome the lack of access to the Korean wholesalers and general lack 
of official data in Liberian fisheries. 
Focus group interviews provided additional detail on the types of fish 
products traded, marketing links, quantities traded, the value-adding 
roles of the key actors and relationships among them as well as in-
efficiencies in the respective value chains examined. The qualitative 
information such as trading links, type of fish products traded, trading 
relationships and value-adding roles was used to map the marketing 
structures and trading relationships between actors in the respective 
fisheries. Data on quantities of fish sold, prices and costs from personal 
interviews provided information on markup and benefit distribution. 
2.3. Net benefits 
The net benefits of fishermen and fish traders and processors are 
defined as the average net difference between total revenues and total 
costs. The total revenue for the fishermen is a product of the ex-vessel 
price [50] or retail price (in the case of fish traders) and the quantity 
of fish sold, whereas the total cost is defined as the aggregate expendi-
ture incurred. For the Kru and Fanti fishers, typical expenses included 
the costs of vessel, fishing gear, fishing license, labor (crew), outboard 
engine and fuel/gasoline (mostly Fanti), repair and maintenance, food 
and bait. For the fish traders, other costs consist of transport, labor, 
preservation and other inputs. 
It proved difficult to obtain full cost estimates from the fishers and 
artisanal traders interviewed. This was partly because chain actors 
suspected the study was done on behalf of the national authorities to 
levy taxes, and partly because fishers do not maintain accurate records 
of their operations, which is typical in SSF [9,57]. Nevertheless, it is 
believed that the reported expenses, captured by this work, reflect the 
typical daily outlays of these value chain actors. 
Average net benefits were converted to USD using the average 
annual exchange rates for 2018, the year the survey was conducted [11]. 
Non-parametric tests were used for hypothesis testing. The 
Kruskal-Wallis test was used to test for differences in net benefits 
1 These wholesalers serve are middlemen between the fishermen and end- 
consumers in external markets. We; therefore, in the paper use the term 
wholesalers and middlemen interchangeably. 
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between fishing seasons and actors within each fishery [24]. 
Mann-Whitney U test was performed for further examining differences 
between net benefits of individual groups [41]. Because of limited 
official statistics, it was difficult to assess total quantities of cassava fish 
and bonny traded at each value chain’s node in both seasons. However, 
this analysis estimated these as shares based on the quantities reported 
by all respondents interviewed. 
3. Results and discussion 
This section presents analysis and discussion of cassava fish and 
bonny trade flows, nature of the trading relationships and net benefits of 
actors in both value chains. 
3.1. Kru cassava fish value chain 
The reported average daily catch (i.e. traded quantity) was 78 kg in 
Fig. 1. Map of the study areas. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Atlas_of_Liberia. Accessed April 12, 2019.fn2  
Fig. 2. Kru fishers value chain for shares (%) of cassava fish traded and value-added by each actor, based on responses from fishers and fish trader groups inter-
viewed in the dry- and rainy seasons. Seasonal average value-added kg  1 “V” calculated for the different actors is based on the average prices received (Table 2). 
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the dry season and 32 kg, in the rainy season. Average monthly catch per 
vessel is estimated to be 1716 kg in the dry season and 288 kg in the 
rainy season, assuming fishers go out five days a week during the dry 
season and two days weekly during the rainy season. Average quantities 
traded in the dry season is nearly six times higher than in the rainy 
season. This refers to average quantities in a month assuming that this is 
mainly driven by the fact that the fishing effort in the rainy season is 
lower. 
During the dry season the Kru fishermen sell their fish directly to 
their wives, Korean wholesalers, artisanal fish traders, mini cold store 
operators or individual consumers (Fig. 2). Due to limited supply mini 
cold store owners and artisanal fish traders do not buy during the rainy 
season (Fig. 2). 
Wives buy around 60% of the total catch during the dry season and 
88% during the rainy season (Fig. 2). Fishermen normally obtain 
informal credits from other sources primarily from their wives and other 
middlemen. Wives provide informal credits to buy fishing equipment 
such as canoes and nets or occasionally to pre-finance fishing trips. The 
fishermen in return repay with fish at a price typically up to 20% lower 
than the highest going price. 
This suggests that fishers’ wives are getting bargain prices in ex-
change for providing (through issuing informal credits) future access to 
gears and other operational expenses. At times, fishers’ wives provide 
fishermen interest-free credits, pay school fees for the kids, food for the 
home, medication in cases of illness etc. Similar financial and non- 
refundable benefits have been reported for similar fisheries in other 
parts of the world [2,13,29]. 
Commercial banks typically require collateral, which is difficult for 
artisanal fishermen to provide. The lack of access to formal credit ser-
vices makes participating in informal credit accords with their wives and 
the Koreans an appealing opportunity, according to fishermen. Crona 
and colleagues [13] also observed this in similar fisheries elsewhere. 
Fishers conceded that “the interest-free credits provided by their 
wives are very important to them especially during the rainy season 
when due to adverse weather conditions they cannot go to sea”. One 
fisher wife confirmed this assertion claiming “we are the men during the 
rainy season providing all the domestic needs for the family”. Note that 
the intermittent operational expenses and interest-free loans provided to 
fishermen typically increase their debts but do not appear to alter the 
bargained price. 
The nature of the relationship between the fishermen and their wives 
can be regarded as captive due to operational dependency or even hi-
erarchical due to the family relationships. Wives pay US$ 2.4 kg  1 
during the dry and US$ 2.6 kg  1 during the rainy seasons (Table 2). 
If this relationship is regarded as a hierarchy-fishermen and wives 
can be seen to operate a vertically integrated fishing enterprise, they sell 
on average US$ 2.5 kg  1 which is essentially the same when artisanal 
fish traders buy directly from the fishermen. This raises questions about 
the value-adding role of fishermen wives and if it could be improved. 
Therefore, it is somewhat difficult to clearly say whether the rela-
tionship between the fishermen and their wives is captive (middlemen) 
or hierarchy (i.e. part of the fishermen’s enterprise) or both. This in-
dicates the need for further research to shed more light on their re-
lationships. If it is regarded as captive, this raises the issue of power and 
information asymmetries which are key obstacles in the value chain, 
otherwise it is difficult to say. 
The second biggest buyers of cassava fish are the Korean wholesalers 
that buy around 15% of the total catch in the dry season and 10% during 
the rainy season (Table 2). According to key informants, Korean na-
tionals who own and operate cold stores in Monrovia, commonly finance 
the purchase fishing canoes and gear, outboard engines and sometimes 
even provide operational expenses. In return, the fishermen repay the 
Koreans with cassava fish, usually up to 50% of a predetermined price 
that remains constant until the loan is paid up. The current bargained 
price is US$ 3 kg  1. Due to this financial dependency between Korean 
wholesalers and fishermen the relationship is considered to be a captive 
one (Table 2). 
However, it was difficult to estimate the actual value of the inputs 
supplied by the Koreans and the interest associated because fishers may 
not have access to fishing inputs at the same price as the Koreans who 
are well connected to the Asian market. This indicates a lack of trans-
parency in the value chain. While informal credit agreements between 
fishers and middlemen are common in SSF, powerful middlemen typi-
cally exploit the vulnerability of fishers who are normally positioned in a 
low-income situation [20,48,52]. In some instances, though, small-scale 
fishers in rural and remote fishing communities prefer these kinds of 
informal credit arrangements [2,13,29]. This is partly because they offer 
security of critical fishing assets which include monetary and 
non-mandatory benefits that facilitate small-scale fishermen value chain 
functions [2,13,29] and partly because middlemen also provide 
connection to outside markets thus lowering the effort and time required 
by fishers to sell their fish [1,13]. Due to this financial dependency 
Table 2 
Kru cassava fish value chain quantity traded, average selling prices and relationships in the dry and rainy seasons.  
Actors/Buyers Dry Season Rainy Season 
Quantity Traded 
(%) 











Fishers wives 60 2.4 Captive & Hierarchy 88 2.6 Captive & Hierarchy 
Korean wholesalers 15 1.5 (3.0) Captive 10 1.5 (3.0) Captive 
Artisanal fish traders 10 2.5 Market – – – 
Mini cold-room operators 9 2.5 Market – – – 
Local consumers 6 2.8 Market 2 3.3 Market 
Average  2.3   2.5  
Wholesaling node 
Fishers wives – 2.5 Market – 3 Market 
Korean wholesalers – 4 Market – 4.3 Market 
Mini cold-room operators – 2.7 Market – – – 
Average  3.1   3.7  
Processing & Retailing node 
Local consumers (fresh fish) – 3.3 Market – 4.2 Market 
Eateries (smoked fish) – 5.2 (3.4) Market – 6 (3.7) Market 
Local consumers (smoked 
fish) 
– 5 (3.1) Market – 5.5 (3.4) Market 
Eateries (fresh fish) – 3.8 Market – 4.5 Market 
Hoteliers (fresh fish) – 5.2 Market – 5.4 Market 
Authors’ Note: 1 kg wet fish ¼ 0.62 kg smoked fish. It was not possible to calculate weighted averages for wholesale and retail nodes due to the lack of official statistics. 
Average prices in parenthesis correspond to yield equivalent (see text). 
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between Korean wholesalers and fishermen, the relationship can be 
regarded as captive. 
The third biggest buyers are the artisanal fish traders who buy 
around 10% directly from the fishermen during the dry season (Table 2). 
There is no dependency in this relationship, and it is based on demand 
and supply as evidenced by the fact that they do not buy directly from 
fishers during the rainy season when there is limited fish supply. The 
average price they pay is US$ 2.5 kg  1 (Table 2). The smallest buyers are 
the local consumers that approach the fishermen at the landing site to 
buy fish for their own consumption. The exchange is purely market- 
based as there is no dependency on either side. Around 6% of the total 
quantity is exchanged in this way. The weighted average price is US$ 
2.3 kg  1 during the dry season and US$ 2.5 kg  1 during the rainy season 
(Table 2). While the weighted average prices for market relationships 
are US$ 2.6 kg  1 in the dry season and US$ 3.3 kg  1 in the rainy season, 
they are US$ 2.5 kg  1 and US$ 2.6 kg  1 for captive relationships 
assuming the Koreans pay US$ 3 kg  1 (Table 2). 
In the next node of the value chains fishers’ wives, usually without 
any value-addition service, wholesale their fish to artisanal traders 
through market sales. Mini cold-room operators, who are usually located 
at the landing sites, wash and preserve their fish in chillers before 
wholesaling to artisanal fish traders through market trade. The value- 
added generated by fishers’ wives averaged around US$ 0.1 kg  1 in 
the dry- and US$ 0.4 kg  1 in the rainy season, whereas for the mini cold- 
room operators it was about US$ 0.2 kg  1 in the dry season (Fig. 2). 
Domestic middlemen thus add value of US$ 0.2 kg  1 in the dry 
season and US$ 0.4 kg  1 in the rainy season for services such as washing, 
chilling to maintain freshness and transport. The value addition services 
performed by cold-room operators may explain the relatively higher 
average price kg  1 they receive compared to fishers’ wives (Table 2). 
This suggests the role of Kru fishers’ wives, in the dry season, is most 
likely related to assisting in fish sales for the family when supply is 
relatively high. 
The average price received by domestic wholesalers was around US$ 
2.6 kg  1 in the dry season and US$ 3 kg  1 in the rainy season (Table 2). 
Korean wholesalers, on the other hand, add the greatest value. They 
clean, sort and package the fish in plastic crates and store in chill boxes, 
before transporting to Monrovia for export, adding on average about US 
$ 1.0 kg  1 in the dry season and US$ 1.3 kg  1 in the rainy season, ac-
cording to key informants (Fig. 2). 
Artisanal fish traders wash the fish and preserve with ice (chillers) or 
sometimes no ice before transporting and retailing through market re-
lationships to local consumers, eateries and hotels in Monrovia and 
other parts of Liberia. Fish processors remove scales, gut and cut the 
head off the fish and in the case of large fish, cut the fish into pieces 
before smoking and retailing (Fig. 2). This suggests retailers add value 
by performing services such as washing, icing, traditional smoking and 
transporting. Given that yield of smoked fish is around 62% [53], this 
indicates processors sell 38% less quantities. Although the study on yield 
from the Torry Research Laboratory [53] is rather old the yield is used 
for this study as there have not been any major changes in smoking 
technologies and product development since it was conducted. 
Traders supplying hoteliers received the highest average price of 
nearly US$ 5.2 kg  1 in the dry season and US$ 5.4 kg  1 in the rainy 
season relative to those targeting other customers. Processors retailing 
smoked fish to eateries received average prices of around US$ 5.2 kg  1 
and US$ 6 kg  1, which when yield is considered correspond to US$ 3.4 
kg  1 and US$ 3.7 kg  1 of fresh fish (Table 2). Hoteliers pay by far the 
highest price which is most probably linked to the quality of the fish they 
buy. This indicates that improved quality attracts higher prices in the 
value chains in both seasons. On average fresh fish retailers received 
around US$ 4.1 kg  1 in the dry season and US$ 4.7 kg  1 in the rainy 
season, while processors obtained around US$ 3.3 kg  1 and US$ 4 kg  1 
for smoking. Value-added produced by fresh fish retailers averaged 
around US$ 1.5 kg  1 in the dry season and US$ 1.7 kg  1 in the rainy 
seasons, whereas processors added about US$ 0.7 kg  1 and US$ 0.6 kg  1 
(Fig. 2). 
The relatively low value produced by processors can most likely be 
attributed to the quality of fish they smoke and sell. Since cassava fish 
normally attracts better price when marketed fresh, retailers usually first 
attempt fresh sales and smoke what fish they cannot sell fresh. It would 
be worthwhile for the Government and NGOs to provide support, such as 
training in early decision-making regarding processing options and 
quality management, to the SSF subsector. 
Kru fishers exchanged roughly 75% and 98% of the total traded 
quantities of cassava fish based on captive relationships in the dry- and 
rainy seasons (Table 3). In the rainy season, fishers usually sell directly 
to their wives who reap increased benefits from higher prices created by 
the excess fish demand (Fig. 2). 
The prices fishers received did not differ noticeably between seasons 
and were primarily based on the type of customers and relationships, 
which has also been reported elsewhere [20]. While fishers realized on 
average roughly US$ 2.6 kg  1 in the dry season and US$ 3.3 kg  1 in the 
rainy season from market sales, they obtained about US$ 2.5 kg  1 and 
US$ 2.6 kg  1 from captive trades assuming the Koreans pay US$ 3 kg  1. 
Value-added services performed by middlemen were limited and 
indicative of low service value chains [14]. Because of the credits pro-
vided to Kru fishers and family connections, fishers’ wives and Korean 
middlemen wielded higher control in the value chain which was re-
flected in their bargaining power. To address the challenges of financial 
dependencies and power asymmetries, the national government could 
implement policy to provide access to microloans to the small-scale 
fishermen to relieve them from transactional dependencies and in-
crease benefits derived by fishers. Microloans might help to improve 
healthy competition, when there is an alternative source of finance 
rather than depending on traders in the value chains for finance, boats 
and equipment, and the value adding role of fishermen’s wives as re-
ported by Bjorndal and associates [6]. 
Hoteliers pay more than double the average price fishermen 
received, in both seasons. The difference in market prices paid by end- 
market buyers, is primarily based on freshness. There is a quality 
incentive in the market that fishers are not receiving perhaps because of 
the lack of information flow along the value chain. 
Kru fishers earn significantly (p-value < 0.05) less benefits in the dry- 
and rainy seasons (US$ 584 and US$ 107 month  1) than to artisanal fish 
traders (Fig. 3). Fresh fish traders made the most benefits (US$ 1458 and 
US$ 919 month  1) followed by processors in both seasons. Other studies 
on SSF have found similar differences between fishermen and fish 
traders [17,33,45,48,57]. Fresh fish traders derived significantly higher 
benefits than processors who operated in similar node (p-value < 0.05), 
which was also observed by Wamukota et al. [57]. 
3.2. Fanti bonny value chain 
The 30 fishers sampled reported daily traded quantities of 706 kg in 
the dry and 292 kg, in the rainy seasons. Because fishermen fish on 
average five and two days weekly in the dry and rainy seasons, this 
suggests average monthly quantities of 15,532 kg in the dry season and 
2,628 kg in the rainy season. In the rainy season small pelagics are not 
typically found in inshore waters in Liberia, and Fanti fishermen are less 
active [40]. During the dry season Fanti fishermen market their bonny, 
directly to their wives, artisanal fish traders and local consumers 
(Fig. 4). Because of reduced supply, fishers sell only to their wives and 
local consumers during the rainy season. 
Wives purchase roughly 85% and 90% of the total quantities traded 
during the dry and rainy seasons (Table 3). They smoke the bonny and 
sell on to artisanal fish traders through market interactions. Wives also 
offer similar informal credits, as observed in the Kru value chain. Fishers 
in return repay with fish at up to 10% lower than the maximum price at 
the landing sites. The business relationship between the fishermen and 
their wives is the same as described for the Kru. The wives pay on 
average US$ 1.1 kg  1 during the dry season and US$ 1.3 kg  1 during the 
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Table 3 
Fanti bonny value chain quantity traded, average selling prices and relationships in the dry and rainy seasons.  
Buyers Dry Season Rainy Season 
Quantity Traded 
(%) 











Fishers wives 85 1.1 Captive & Hierarchy 90 1.3 Captive & Hierarchy 
Artisanal fish 
traders 
10 1 Market – – – 
Local consumers 5 1.2 Market 10 1.4 Market 
Weighted Average  1.1   1.3  
Wholesaling node 
Fishers wives – 2 (1.4) Market – 2.5(1.7) Market 
Processing & Retailing node 
Local consumers – 2.3(1.5) Market – 2.8 (1.9) Market 
Eateries – 2.6 (1.7) Market – 2.9 (1.9) Market 
Average  2.5 (1.7)   2.9 (1.9)  
Authors’, note 3 kg fresh bonny produce 2 kg of smoked fish. It was not possible to calculate weighted averages for wholesale and retail nodes due to the lack of official 
statistics. Average prices in parenthesis correspond to yield equivalent (see text). 
Fig. 3. Net benefits month  1 of Kru fishermen and fish traders in the dry and rainy seasons. Bars indicate two standard errors.  
Fig. 4. Fanti fishers value chain for shares (%) of bonny quantity traded and value-added by each actor, based on responses from fishers and fish trader groups 
interviewed in the dry and rainy seasons. Seasonal average value-added kg  1 “V” calculated for the different actors is based on the average prices received (Table 3). 
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rainy season (Table 3) and they are the sole middlemen wholesaling 
bonny in both seasons, which indicates a complete lack of competition. 
The features of the credit arrangements in the Kru and Fanti fisheries are 
comparable to those described for similar SSF elsewhere [2,13,29,36]. 
Artisanal fish traders are the second most important buyers who 
purchase directly from the fishermen about 10% of the total quantity 
traded during the dry season but nothing directly during the rainy sea-
son. There appears to be no operational reliance in this bond, and it is 
based on supply and demand and thus a market relationship. They pay 
on average around US$ 1 kg  1 of bonny, during the dry season (Table 3). 
The relatively low price paid by artisanal fish traders in market trans-
actions during the dry season can be attributed to market gluts, when 
fishers typically sell to anyone at any price to obtain some value from 
their catch [40]. This is because their wives do not have the capacity to 
smoke the whole catch. Local consumers, who purchase bonny from the 
fishermen, are the smallest customers (Fig. 4). The trade is 
market-based. About 2% and 10% of the total quantities traded are sold 
in this way, in the dry- and rainy seasons (Table 3). They pay average 
prices of US$ 1.2 kg  1 and US$ 1.4 kg  1 during the dry- and rainy 
seasons. 
In the subsequent node of the value chain, fishers’ wives wash and 
smoke the bonny and wholesale to artisanal fish traders (Table 3). There 
seems to be no transactional dependency in this trade, which is based on 
market relationships. Because yield of smoked bonny is roughly 67% 
[53] of its wet weight, it is assumed that bonny wholesalers exchange 
33% less quantities. Average prices received by bonny wholesalers were 
around US$ 2 kg  1 in the dry season and US$ 2.5 kg  1 in the rainy 
season (Table 3) corresponding to US$ 1.4 kg  1 in the dry season and US 
$ 1.7 kg  1 in the rainy season kg  1 for fresh fish . The value-added 
produced by bonny wholesalers averaged around US$ 0.6 kg  1 in the 
dry season and US$ 0.8 kg  1 in the rainy season (Fig. 4). Bonny 
wholesalers generate higher value in comparison to the cassava fish 
domestic wholesalers. The lack of competition in the wholesaling node 
and the value-added by smoking may explain the higher value added by 
bonny middlemen. 
Artisanal fish traders normally transport and retail their products to 
local consumers and eateries in Monrovia and other places in Liberia 
(Fig. 4). The exchange between the parties is market-based, because 
there is no transactional reliance and it depends on demand for and 
supply of fish. Retailers targeting eateries received better average prices 
of roughly US$ 2.6 kg  1 in the dry season and 2.9 kg  1 in the rainy 
season compared to those aiming for local consumers who receive on 
average US$ 2.3 kg  1 and US$ 2.8 kg  1. The average prices received by 
retailers were roughly US$ 1.7 kg  1 in the dry season and US$ 2 kg  1 in 
the rainy season (Table 3). The value-added created by retailers aver-
aged approximately US$ 0.6 kg  1 in the dry season and US$ 0.3 kg  1 in 
the rainy season. While the average mark-ups by bonny retailers were 
about 20% in the dry season and 12% in the rainy season, they were 55% 
and 62% for bonny middlemen indicating retailers added less value in 
both seasons. 
Fanti fishers in the dry- and rainy seasons sold around 95% and 90% 
of the total quantities of bonny to their wives, while roughly 2% and 
10% were sold through market interactions (Table 3). As observed in the 
Kru value chain, during the rainy season, when there is excess fish de-
mand and prices are high, Fanti fishers typically sell to their wives to 
increase overall family benefits. 
Prices received depended on the type of relationships and did not 
differ much. Fishers realized average prices of roughly US$ 1.2 kg  1 in 
the dry season and US$ 1.4 kg  1 in the rainy season from market ar-
rangements, whereas they received around US$ 1.1 kg  1 and US$ 1.3 
kg  1 from captive and hierarchy sales. 
There seem to be indications that if Kru fishers were financially in-
dependent of middlemen informal credit arrangements and sold all 
cassava fish at market price (i.e. US$ 2.6 kg  1 in the dry and US$ 3.3 
kg  1 in the rainy seasons), average monthly revenues could increase to 
� US$ 4500 in the dry and US$ 950 in the rainy season for them 
compared to about US$ 4300 in the dry and US$ 750 in the rainy season 
from captive or hierarchy sales. This may be unlikely in rural and remote 
SSF. Captive or hierarchy relationships are apparently commonplace 
elsewhere [see, 2, 13, 29]. The Fantis (at US$1.1 kg  1 in the dry- and US 
$ 1.4 kg  1 in the rainy reasons) indicate average monthly revenues of �
US$ 17,085 and US$ 3700 compared to US$ 17,085 and US$ 3420 from 
captive or hierarchy sales in both seasons. 
However, this does not take into full account the benefits that may be 
included in the informal credits agreements with the middlemen which 
according to fishermen and their financiers are quite substantial and 
essential for their daily operations. There are no indications that all fish 
produced by small-scale fishermen in both value chains could be sold at 
market price. There is a need to further assess the probable benefits 
small-scale fishermen in Liberia derive from the informal credits 
schemes with middlemen. 
In this case, market sales appear to be economically beneficial for 
Kru fishers relative to captive or even hierarchy, whereas it represents 
�8% increase in monthly revenues for Fanti fishers during the rainy 
season. 
As observed in the Kru value chain, the differences in price paid by 
end-market buyers are based on the type of smoked bonny. The price 
paid by eateries nearly doubles in both seasons, suggesting a market 
incentive for quality improvement. 
In both seasons, Fanti fishermen realize on average significantly 
lower monthly net benefits (US$ 1940 and US$ 114 month  1) relative to 
processors (US$ 2154 and US$ 540 month  1) (p-value < 0.05) (Fig. 5). 
The current analysis of net benefits flows between fishers and traders in 
the bonny value chain follow similar pattern reported elsewhere [17,33, 
45,48,57], as was also observed in the Kru chain. 
4. Conclusion and policy recommendations 
This study set out to understand the value-adding roles of the main 
actors in the Kru and the Fanti fish value chains and how their net 
benefits are impacted by the relationships among them and the seasonal 
variations in fish supply. Primarily the cassava fish value chain consists 
of Kru fishers, middlemen and retailers in both seasons. Middlemen were 
mainly engaged in the buying of cassava fish, cleaning and cooling it 
before wholesale, whereas retailers were involved in purchasing, pro-
cessing and retailing in end-markets. There are fewer actors in the value 
chains associated with the Fanti boats, such as the bonny, compared to 
the Kru value chains. 
Fishers’ wives and Korean buyers occupy central roles as fishers’ 
main financiers in the cassava fish value chain and therefore wield 
higher power and handle the major share of the total quantities traded in 
both seasons. This represents a captive or hierarchy relationship with 
Kru fishers and is caused by financial dependency between the parties. 
Mini cold-room operators buy cassava fish from Kru fishers in an 
operation based on demand and supply. Mini cold-room operators and 
the Koreans increase value by washing, packing and chilling, whereas 
fishers’ wives appear not to add any value to the fish. Retailers buy 
cassava fish through market relationship with Kru fishers, and add value 
by washing, chilling and smoking before selling to consumers. 
Fishers wives and retailers were identified as the main actors in the 
Fanti value chain. These actors perform different roles in the Fanti value 
chain as compared to the Kru. The Fanti fishers are the main suppliers of 
bonny selling to middlemen, retailers and individual consumers in both 
seasons. Their wives were the sole middlemen and main sponsors 
exercising greater power in the bonny value chain in both seasons than 
in the cassava value chain. Wives handled major shares of the total 
quantities of bonny and bought through captive or even hierarchy re-
lationships with Fanti fishers, as was also observed in the Kru. Bonny 
middlemen increased value more by smoking compared to Kru fishers’ 
wives, who added little or no value. Bonny retailers purchased bonny 
based on demand and supply and increased value through smoking. The 
role of fishers‘ wives in the Kru value chain is somewhat unclear as they 
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do not appear to add value. There is a need to better understand the 
involvement of fishermen’s wives and how to improve their role in 
adding value to the catch. 
Average mark-ups of Kru fish processors were 27% in the dry season 
and 33% in the rainy season in the Kru value chain, whereas they were 
58% and 57% for fresh fish traders. This means, in both chains and 
seasons, bonny retailers generated the lowest value kg  1, while most 
value was added by fresh fish retailers. The price kg  1 received by 
fishers, in both value chains examined, were based on the type of re-
lationships and did not differ much. The average price kg  1 fishermen 
received between seasons in both value chains may be higher, if the full 
benefits of the informal agreements were considered. 
Generally, market-based relationships encourage competition 
among buyers, offer better prices and appear to be more profitable for 
fishermen compared to captive or hierarchy relationships. There are 
indications that if all catches were to be sold at market price the average 
Kru fisherman’s monthly revenues would increase by up to US$ 115 and 
US$ 186 during the dry- and rainy seasons and the Fanti fisherman’s 
monthly earnings could increase by up to US$ 1630 and US$ 237 during 
the dry and rainy seasons compared to current revenues. There is no 
evidence that this scenario might occur because the informal credits 
accords with middlemen are invaluable to the small-scale fishermen in 
both value chains. Establishing a well-functioning market is difficult due 
to the nature of these fisheries and the existing infrastructure. 
The quantities of fish traded in the dry season were roughly six times 
greater than the rainy season, assuming this is mainly driven by the fact 
that effort applied by fishermen in the rainy season is lower. The average 
prices of fish peak during the rainy season. Because of the reduced 
supply, fishers in both value chains mostly exchange through their 
wives, during the rainy season. Competition was weak or even lacking 
because of the bargaining power of fishers’ financiers. Both value chains 
were typified by low value-addition services and poorly developed in 
comparison to high services seafood value chains in more affluent 
countries [31,46]. 
End-market prices indicate opportunities for interventions to in-
crease returns of fishers. Marketing signals linked to quality were re-
flected in the average prices paid by hoteliers and eateries in both value 
chains and seasons. While more extensive market trade would be 
beneficial for fishers, financially dependent relationships and the lack of 
information generate obstacles for this to happen [20,48]. This means, 
although it is possible to enhance value for fishers in both seasons, 
power asymmetries and the information externality in both value chains 
would need to be tackled through policy interventions. 
Kru fishers were not able to estimate the actual costs of the inputs 
supplied to them by the Koreans who are using their bargaining position 
to generate more profits by supplying fishermen with inputs on credit. 
This lack of transparency in the value chain makes it difficult to establish 
the real price fishermen receive. The same applies to the fishermen’s 
wives that provide funding for the fisherman and pay lower prices than 
in market relationships. This raises questions about fishermen’s access 
to other funds and puts pressure on the government to provide access to 
financial services to rescue small-scale fishers from predatory behavior 
of powerful traders. 
Fanti fishers on average realize higher monthly net benefits in both 
seasons than Kru fishers but the net benefits are relatively higher in the 
dry rather than the rainy season. Whereas bonny retailers made the most 
monthly net benefits in the dry season, fresh fish retailers in the Kru 
value chain realized the greatest benefits in the rainy season. Fresh fish 
traders earned about US$ 874 more per month in the dry season and US$ 
812 more per month during the rainy season than the Kru fishers, 
whereas processors realized US$ 84 monthly and US$ 148 monthly 
more. Bonny traders received around US$ 213 per month during the dry 
season and US$ 426 per month during the rainy more net benefits 
relative to Fanti fishers. Thus, in both value chains and seasons, fishers 
earn less benefits in comparison to traders. The net benefits of all actors 
in both value chains significantly decreased during the rainy season 
particularly for fishermen. 
Given the results of this study, the following policy recommendations 
emerge. In order to raise fishers’ benefits and increase overall efficiency 
in the value chains, we suggest that:  
(i) basic fisheries infrastructures and trainings to improve quality 
and handling in the value chains should be provided; and  
(ii) a microloan facility should be instituted, providing an alternative 
source of finance and thus increasing competition among mid-
dlemen. This might improve fishermen ability to sell their fish at 
market price in response to market signals. 
For this to be possible, the government and or NGOs should provide 
support through establishing essential fisheries infrastructure such as ice 
and chill facilities, suitable sanitary facilities and hands-on training to 
improve quality handling and processing in the value chain. Ideally 
infrastructure should be established close to the landing sites, equipped 
and functioning, where fishermen and traders will have direct access to 
the facilities to add value to the fish. The government needs to provide 
less demanding and restrictive microloans to the SSF subsector as an 
alternative source of finance. While this would give fishermen access to 
the needed investment finance, it would also serve to break their 
financial dependencies on dominant middlemen and consolidate their 
ability to sell their fish at market price. If the relationship between the 
fishermen and their wives is regarded as hierarchy-single fishing en-
terprise, external microloans might be helpful in improving the handling 
Fig. 5. Net monthly benefits of Fanti fishers and fish processors in the dy and rainy seasons. Bars indicate two standard error.  
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of the catch i.e. fishers’s wives could improve their value adding role 
which has implications for the price they receive. The value adding role 
of fishers‘ wives is unclear and limited. 
Increasing competition among middlemen, enabling fishermen to 
sell 100% of the catch in both seasons at market price, is a policy option 
that could augment fishers’ benefits. This has been observed as a strat-
egy to rescue fishers from powerful traders who want to secure regular 
supply of fish [58]. However, for increased competition to result in 
higher market price for fishers, they must be organized as collectives to 
establish better bargaining position. Further analysis should be under-
taken to quantify other economic benefits of the informal credit ar-
rangements provided fishermen in the SSF before implementing this 
policy measure. 
Fishers should be able to respond to quality signals from the high end 
of the market by taking portable ice containers onboard their canoes to 
maintain fish quality, which would then lead to a better price for them. 
Fishers can now sell their fish at market price, to increase their benefits, 
because they have other source of finance to operate. Cassava fish main 
middlemen, on the other hand, who before added no value to the fish 
would then increase value by performing services such as cleaning, icing 
or smoking before wholesale. 
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